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ABSTRACT 
 In response to growing fears from the entertainment industry 
over online file-sharing of valuable content, the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”) enacted sweeping 
regulations over the production of electronic devices in the name of 
protecting digital television broadcasts.  Although the FCC’s 
“broadcast flag” regulation was struck down on jurisdictional 
grounds, Hollywood has not given up the push for strict control. If 
Hollywood successfully acquires broadcast flag protection there 
could be far-reaching implications for innovation and development 
of new digital technologies. While content providers have 
important reasons to protect copyrighted material, there is too 
much at stake to merely acquiesce to their demands in the name of 
piracy prevention. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 On May 6, 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit decided the case of American Library Ass’n v. FCC.2  The 
American Library Association (“ALA”) had challenged the FCC’s 
jurisdiction to adopt the so-called “broadcast flag” regulation.3  In brief, the 
broadcast flag was designed to limit high quality digital copying of digital 
broadcast television (“DTV”) signals.  The FCC claimed it had the authority 
to regulate any device “associated with the overall circuit of messages sent 
and received — such as digital television receiving equipment.”4  The FCC 
further claimed that it had “ancillary jurisdiction” to adopt the broadcast 
flag regulations in order to carry out its mandate for transitioning to DTV.5   
                                                     
1 B.F.A. in Film and Television Production, New York University, 2000; 
Candidate for J.D., Duke University School of Law, 2006; Candidate for M.A. 
in Cultural Anthropology, Duke University, 2006.  The author would like to 
thank Professor David Lange for his guidance in the development of this iBrief.   
2 406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
3 Id. at 691; Digital Broadcast Content Protection, 69 Fed. Reg. 2,688 (Jan. 20, 
2004) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73, 76). 
4 Brief for Respondents at 17, Am. Library Ass’n. v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005) (No. 04-1037). 
5 In the Matter of: Digital Broadcast Content Protection, MB Docket No. 02-
230, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 
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¶2 In a unanimous decision, a three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit 
held that the FCC lacked the jurisdiction to pass the broadcast flag 
regulation.6  According to the court, the broadcast flag “imposes regulations 
on devices that receive communications after those communications have 
occurred; it does not regulate the communications themselves.”7  The 
FCC’s argument was rejected wholesale because the court found:  
In this case, all relevant materials concerning the FCC’s jurisdiction — 
including the words of the Communications Act of 1934, its legislative 
history, subsequent legislation, relevant case law, and Commission 
practice — confirm that the FCC has no authority to regulate 
consumer electronic devices that can be used for receipt of wire or 
radio communication when those devices are not engaged in the 
process of a radio or wire transmission.8   
In other words, “[t]here is no statutory foundation for the broadcast flag 
rules, and consequently the rules are ancillary to nothing.”9   
¶3 Shortly after the decision by the D.C. Circuit, the Motion Picture 
Association of America (“MPAA”) began pushing a draft bill that would 
give express Congressional approval to the FCC’s jurisdiction over the 
broadcast flag.10  Calls for a Congressionally mandated broadcast flag also 
appeared in committee meetings focused on setting a final date for DTV 
conversion.11  While the House Commerce Committee Chairman opposes 
the addition of the broadcast flag to the DTV transition bill12 and the 
MPAA was unable to attach the broadcast flag to an unrelated 
                                                                                                                       
23550, 23564 (Nov. 4, 2003), available at 
http://www.commreg.pf.com/Pfdocuments/FCCRcdPDFs/Fcc03-273.pdf 
[hereinafter FCC Report and Order]. 
6 Am. Library Ass’n., 406 F.3d at 696. 
7 Id. at 703. 
8 Id. at 708. 
9 Id. at 692. 




11 TVTechnology.com, Subsidies Are Sticky Point in DTV Draft Bill, May 27, 
2005, http://www.tvtechnology.com/dailynews/one.php?id=2981. 
12 Donna Wentworth, CommDaily: MPAA May Not Seek Broadcast Flag in DTV 
Bill, June 1, 2005, 
http://www.corante.com/copyfight/archives/2005/06/01/commdaily_mpaa_may
_not_seek_broadcast_flag_in_dtv_bill.php. 
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appropriations bill,13 it is quite clear that Hollywood is not willing to 
abandon the flag just yet.   
¶4 The broadcast flag is one example of the dogged tenacity of 
Hollywood and the other content providers to set the legal and policy 
agenda for intellectual property in the digital age.  An examination of the 
regulation as passed by the FCC illustrates the short-sightedness embodied 
in many of the recent attempts to protect legitimate copyright interests 
against digital piracy.  That the broadcast flag was struck down by the D.C. 
Circuit on jurisdictional grounds leaves the important questions of copyright 
law and innovation policy unanswered.  The rise and fall of the broadcast 
flag reveals many of the key issues that must be resolved in order to ensure 
the careful balance of copyright is not distorted in a blind and arrogant 
response to changing technology.  Before it is too late, the public must 
realize what is at stake in the debate over copyright in the digital age and 
make sure their voices are heard. 
I. THE STORY OF THE BROADCAST FLAG 
¶5 In order to appreciate the broadcast flag as emblematic of a larger 
problem surrounding intellectual property, it is important to understand 
what the broadcast flag is, why Hollywood asked for it, and how it became 
law. 
A. What is the broadcast flag? 
¶6 The broadcast flag can best be understood as the combination of a 
marker identifying digital broadcast television programs and regulations 
passed by the FCC covering devices that will come into contact with such 
programs.14  The marker itself, the actual flag, is a simple collection of bits 
embedded into the signal of DTV transmissions under the standard adopted 
by the Advanced Television Systems Committee (“ATSC”).15  Included in 
the flag is the ATSC approved “redistribution control” which is designed to 
indicate whether the marked program can or cannot be redistributed.16  On 
its own, this is a rather unremarkable technology, but combined with the 
                                                     
13 Declan McCullagh, Senate Punts on Broadcast Flag Option, June 23, 2005, 
CNET NEWS.COM, http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-5759807.html. 
14 CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY, IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
BROADCAST FLAG: A PUBLIC INTEREST PRIMER (VERSION 2.0) 6 (2003), 
available at http://www.cdt.org/copyright/031216broadcastflag.pdf [hereinafter 
CDT Report].  The website for the CDT is http://www.cdt.org/. 
15 FCC Report and Order, supra note 5, at 23559-60. 
16 ADVANCED TELEVISION SYSTEMS COMMITTEE, ATSC STANDARD: PROGRAM 
AND SYSTEM INFORMATION PROTOCOL FOR TERRESTRIAL BROADCAST AND 
CABLE (REVISION B) 79 (2003), available at 
http://www.atsc.org/standards/a_65b.pdf. 
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FCC regulation passed in November 2003 it is controversial.17  The flag 
itself and the accompanying regulations apply only to DTV signals 
transmitted over-the-air, i.e. through the use of an antenna connected to a 
television set.18 
¶7 At the core of the broadcast flag rule is the requirement that all 
devices which come into contact with flagged DTV signals “recognize and 
give effect” to the wishes of the content provider regarding the ability to 
redistribute the program.19  This regulation was scheduled to go into effect 
for all equipment manufactured for use in the United States as of July 2005 
and included not just digital television sets, but also personal video 
recorders, personal computers configured to receive a broadcast television 
signal, DVD recorders and various other types of equipment.20   
¶8 Under the regulation, the FCC would be in charge of approving 
“authorized technologies.”21  Currently, all but one of the technologies 
proposed by manufacturers for handling flagged content greatly restricts 
any transmission of flagged content over the Internet.22  All authorized 
technologies must also meet “Robustness Requirements” designed to 
prevent circumvention of protected devices and subsequent downstream 
distribution.23  The current standard of robustness requires that the 
technologies cannot be avoided “merely by an ordinary user using generally 
available tools or equipment.”24  
B. Why Hollywood says the broadcast flag is necessary 
¶9 As the Internet has increased in popularity, large-scale illicit 
copying and distribution of copyrighted materials has caused great alarm in 
                                                     
17 Digital Broadcast Content Protection, 69 Fed. Reg. 2,688 (Jan. 20, 2004) 
(codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73, 76). 
18 See FCC Report and Order, supra note 5, at 23552.  There are already 
encryption technologies in place for satellite and cable television transmissions, 
but those encryptions occur at the transmission source. 
19 CDT Report, supra note 14, at 11 (stating “[A]ny new device capable of 
demodulating DTV content must - 1. check for the presence of the flag; 2. 
encrypt any flagged content using ‘authorized technologies;’ 3. allow digital 
recordings of flagged content using only authorized technologies; and 4. allow 
digital transmission of flagged content via secured digital outputs using 
authorized technology to other “compliant” devices . . . Collectively these 
requirements are referred to in the FCC rule as Compliance Requirements.” 
20 FCC Report and Order, supra note 5, at 23570 (stating “[t]his necessarily 
includes PC and IT products that are used for off-air DTV reception.”) 
21 47 C.F.R. § 73.9008 (2004). 
22 CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY, ALL EYES ON TIVO (July 26, 
2004), available at http://www.cdt.org/copyright/20040726tivoflag.pdf. 
23 FCC Report and Order, supra note 5, at 23570-72. 
24 47 C.F.R. § 73.9007 (2004). 
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Hollywood and led to significant litigation.25  Originally used mostly to 
share music files, peer-to-peer file-sharing networks are now providing an 
alternate avenue for consumers to obtain high-quality digital copies of 
music, films and television shows for free.26  The MPAA and its Hollywood 
allies say the broadcast flag is necessary because of the unique business 
model of broadcast television and the rise in online TV file-sharing.  While 
television programs and other video files like feature films constitute a 
minority of the files on peer to peer networks and bandwidth limitations 
make downloading DTV files extremely time consuming, Hollywood is 
fearful that we are on the cusp of the “Napsterization” of video.27 
¶10 There are two problems specific to the business models of movie 
studios and television broadcasters that are not present in concerns about 
music file-sharing: the dependence on repurposing28 and the advertising-
based revenue model.29  First, movie and television studios currently have a 
business model designed around repurposing content, which is the ability to 
exploit a multitude of distribution windows throughout the life of a film or 
television program.30  Studios tightly control the licensing and distribution 
of their content through each progressive window.31  Revenue is obtained 
through theatrical exhibition, use by airlines, rental, sales of DVDs and 
videotapes, satellite, cable, and over-the-air broadcast television.32  As 
content travels through the various windows, revenue streams from each 
individual window can be affected by the problem of leakage.  If an 
unauthorized, high-quality copy of a given film or television program can 
be obtained from an over-the-air television signal, there could be a negative 
effect on the revenue streams from DVD sales, or a decrease in the price a 
studio could set for the cable license of the film or TV show.33 
                                                     
25 See e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005). 
26 Laura Rich, Hollywood Braces for ‘Napsterization,’ THE INDUSTRY 




28 CDT Report, supra note 14, at 6; see also WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES 
TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 65-70 
(2004). 
29 Peter Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 63, 106 (2002-2003). 
30 Fisher, supra note 28, at 65-70. 
31 Id. 
32 Id.; see also CDT report, supra note 14, at 6. 
33 See, e.g., Joint Comments of the Motion Picture Association of America Inc., 
et al., to the Federal Communications Commission, in the matter of Digital 
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¶11 The second concern rises from the advertising-based revenue model 
of broadcast television.  Broadcast television is available free of charge to 
anyone with a television set and a tuner.34  Even pay television services, 
such as cable and satellite are required to carry the signals of the traditional 
over-the-air networks and make them available to their subscribers.35  The 
copyright holders and content creators make their money on television 
through the sale of advertising time during broadcasts. Thus, it is the 
advertisers who pay the film and television producers, not the viewers.36  
¶12 Many in Hollywood fear that if viewers can record these programs 
at home, they will cut out the very ads that fund these programs. 
Interestingly, when the movie studios challenged the introduction of the 
home video tape recorder in the seminal Sony Betamax case,37 it was due in 
large part to the fear that recording and watching a television show at one’s 
convenience, while fast-forwarding through the commercials, would destroy 
the advertising revenue needed to sustain broadcast television.38  Although 
statistics have subsequently demonstrated that this fear was unfounded, it 
has re-emerged in the era of Internet file-sharing.39 
¶13 The film and television industries are hoping to learn from the 
experience of the music industry in its fight against Napster and plan to 
prevent the copying of video before it reaches epidemic proportions.  
Hollywood has put forth two goals: (1) preventing the availability of one 
perfect digital copy on the Internet and (2) creating a “speed bump” 
designed to “prevent easy widespread copying by regular consumers.”40  It 
is probably impossible to completely destroy the possibility of creating and 
distributing one perfect digital copy; sophisticated users will surely exist 
who can circumvent even the most extensive protections.41  However, 
                                                                                                                       
Broadcast Copy Protection, 8-10 (MB Docket No. 02-230) (Dec. 2002) 
[hereinafter MPAA Comments].  
34 See Answers.com, Free to Air TV, http://www.answers.com/topic/free-to-air-
tv?method=5&linktext=free%20to%20air%20TV (last visited Sept. 27, 2005). 
35 47 U.S.C. § 534 (2000). 
36 Menell, supra note 29, at 106. 
37 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 452 
(D.C. Cal. 1979), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), 
rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
38 Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 452.  
39 Matthew W. Bower, Note, Replaying the Betamax Case for the New Digital 
VCRs: Introducing TiVo to Fair Use, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 417, 442 
(2002) (citing to Nielsen study on the impact of the VCR on television viewing); 
Branch Furtado, Television: Peer-to-Peer’s Next Challenger, 2005 DUKE L. & 
TECH. REV. 7, ¶ 1-8 (2005), 
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2005dltr0007.html. 
40 CDT Report, supra note 14, at 7. 
41 Id. 
2005 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 24 
curtailing the ability of the average consumer to easily copy DTV content is 
much more feasible, and it is towards this goal that the broadcast flag is 
directed.42  
C. How the broadcast flag became law 
¶14 Hollywood’s first major attempt to attack the problems of video 
file-sharing was the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion 
Act introduced in Congress by Senator Fritz Hollings in March 2002.43  
Hollings’ bill would have created an incredibly broad, government 
mandated, digital rights management (“DRM”) scheme designed to protect 
digital content from illegal copying.44  Any electronic device that came into 
contact with digital content of any variety would have to comply with the 
government established DRM standards.45  Public opposition to the bill 
forced Hollings and the video industry to abandon the proposal.46   
¶15 The current transition of broadcast television from analog to digital 
transmission has provided an ideal opening for Hollywood to renew their 
piracy concerns.47  The current timeline for full DTV transmission set by 
the FCC calls for all over-the-air television programs to be sent digitally by 
the end of 2006.48  Once the DTV transition is complete the areas of the 
broadcast spectrum currently being used for analog TV will be auctioned 
off for other uses, potentially resulting in billions of dollars of revenue and 
innovative new communications developments.49  This transition is the 
cause of much anxiety for content providers who fear that if a given digital 
signal can be received for free, copied at little to no marginal cost and no 
loss of quality, and then transmitted for free via the Internet, content 
providers will refuse to make their content available through DTV.50 
¶16 If the major film and television studios withhold their “high-value” 
content, the “DTV transition may be seriously threatened.”51  Hollywood 
found a receptive audience to this line of argument in the FCC, which has 
been charged by Congress with overseeing the DTV transition.52  The FCC 
                                                     
42 Id. 
43 S. 2048, 107th Cong. (2002). 
44 Id. 
45 Id at § 5. 
46 Digital-Copyright Bill Inspires Flurry of Criticism, ELECTRONIC MUSICIAN, 
April 10, 2002, available at 
http://emusician.com/ar/emusic_digitalcopyright_bill_inspires/. 
47 CDT Report, supra note 14, at 7. 
48 Id.  
49 Id.   
50 MPAA Comments, supra note 33, at 6-7. 
51 Id. at 8-10. 
52 FCC Report and Order, supra note 5, at 23564-5.  
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adopted the broadcast flag proposal submitted by the Broadcast Protection 
Discussion Group (“BPDG”)53 as the best available means for protecting 
DTV content because it “provides a satisfactory level of redistribution 
control at a minimal cost to both consumers and manufacturers.”54   
II. THE CRITICISM AND FAILINGS OF THE BROADCAST FLAG 
¶17 The broadcast flag regulation has been widely criticized.55  In the 
words of one critic: 
[The broadcast flag] creates a whole new regime of constraining 
regulation all at once: restrictions on internet use; design mandates for 
consumer electronic equipment, including the traditionally open-
platform PC; and licensing requirements for any device that connects 
to the regulated device.  Unpredictable, amplifying, and possibly 
conflicting results from these downstream effects are likely to 
follow.56  
Specifically, critics have claimed that the flag’s technological flaws 
contradict the stated goals of the flag regulation and more importantly, that 
the flag is contrary to traditional notions of copyright law.   
                                                     
53 According to the MPAA, the BPDG is “a working group comprised of a large 
number of content providers, television broadcasters, consumer electronics 
manufacturers, Information Technology companies, interested individuals and 
consumer activists” which was formed to “evaluat[e] the suitability of the 
broadcast flag for protecting DTV content and to determine whether there was 
substantial support for the flag.”  The BPDG Report formed the basis of the 
broadcast flag regulation as passed by the FCC.  Broadcast Flag Frequently 
Asked Questions, http://www.mpaa.org/Press/Broadcast_Flag_QA.htm (last 
visited Aug. 28, 2005) [hereinafter MPAA FAQ].   Some critics claim that the 
main body of the Report was drafted in secret negotiations “between 7 
Hollywood movie studios, 5 electronics companies, and 1 computer trade 
association” and does not reflect the opinions of the “large number” of interested 
parties the MPAA claims. EFF Consensus at Lawyerpoint: MPAA FAQ on 
Broadcast Flag, http://bpdg.blogs.eff.org/archives/000148.html (last visited Aug.  
28, 2005) [hereinafter EFF FAQ]. 
54 FCC Report and Order, supra note 5, at 23559. 
55 Chief among these are the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Public 
Knowledge. For information on each organization’s opposition to the broadcast 
flag see http://www.eff.org/broadcastflag/ and 
http://www.publicknowledge.org/issues/bfcase. 
56 Susan Crawford, Shortness of Vision: Regulatory Ambition in the Digital Age 
21 (Cardozo School of Law, Jacob Burns Institute for Adv. Legal Studies, Work 
Paper No. 102, 2005) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=681409. 
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A. The technological and regulatory flaws of the broadcast flag 
¶18 The three most commonly discussed technological or regulatory 
flaws of the broadcast flag are the analog hole, the legacy loophole, and the 
foreign market loophole.  The analog hole describes the fact that because 
the broadcast flag is attached only to digital signals, an individual can make 
an analog copy of a DTV program and transfer the copy back into a digital 
format using an analog-to-digital converter.57  This high quality, flag-free, 
digital copy can then be placed on the Internet and widely shared.58  The 
second flaw is the related legacy loophole, which in simple terms means 
that the broadcast flag will not be acknowledged by equipment 
manufactured before the start date.59  Tech-savvy users could exploit pre-
regulation equipment to make high-quality copies available on the 
Internet.60  Flag advocates assume that “consumer desire for better and 
more functional equipment will render the legacy hole moot,”61 but this is 
not a guaranteed result.  The final flaw is the foreign market loophole.62  
The regulation makes it clear that “products manufactured in the United 
States solely for export” are not regulated.63  The two major problems with 
this possible loophole are that manufacturers may now create two different 
versions of the same equipment (one for domestic sale and the other for 
export) and that foreign DTV viewers will have the freedom to make digital 
copies while American viewers will not.64   
B. The legal and philosophical criticisms of the broadcast flag 
¶19 In addition to the three major flaws discussed above critics have 
taken issue with a number of more general effects of the regulations as 
adopted.  These criticisms include concerns about protecting traditional 
notions of copyright, supporting consumer rights, and ensuring continued 
technological innovation.  Looming over all of these concerns is the 
                                                     
57 See, e.g., Lisa M. Ezra, Note, The Failure of the Broadcast Flag: Copyright 
Protection to Make Hollywood Happy, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 383, 
391-92 (Winter 2005).   
58 Id.  
59 FCC Report and Order, supra note 5, at 23558. 
60 See Ezra, supra note 57, at 394. 
61 Id. 
62 Ernest Miller, Broadcast Flag Loophole Watch – Manufacture for Export 
(Nov. 5, 2003), 
http://www.corante.com/importance/archives/2003/11/05/broadcast_flag_loopho
le_watch_manufacture_for_export.php; Ezra, supra note 57, at 393-94.  
63 47 C.F.R. § 73.9009 (2004). 
64 Ezra, supra note 57, at 393. 
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possibility of global broadcast flag regulations that would be even more 
severe than the domestic flag.65 
1. Protecting traditional notions of copyright 
¶20 Under American copyright laws and jurisprudence, statutory 
protection is granted for fair use of copyrighted materials.66  Over the past 
twenty-five years there has been a growing appreciation of the sphere of 
works outside the scope of intellectual property protection, commonly 
referred to as the public domain.67  Critics charge that the implementation 
of the broadcast flag threatens both fair use and the public domain. 
¶21 Fair use, defined broadly, allows individuals to make certain uses of 
a copyrighted work that do not violate the exclusive rights of the copyright 
holder.68  Under section 107 of the Copyright Act, users are not liable for 
copyright infringement when copyrighted material is used “for purposes 
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple 
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research.”69  The Supreme Court 
has recognized fair use as one of the two fundamental First Amendment 
safeguards inherent in American copyright law.70  The determination of fair 
use is made on a case-by-case basis71 and the four statutory fair use factors 
enumerated in section 107 are applied to the specific facts of the case.72   
¶22 The broadcast flag does not allow for any such case-by-case 
analysis; it is set at the time of transmission, either to allow copying or not 
allow copying.73  If there is not a secure technological way to prevent a 
possible fair use from turning into widespread online distribution, the use 
will be prevented by the approved technologies.  “Under the broadcast flag 
                                                     
65 See Crawford, supra note 56, at 23; Siva Vaidhyanathan, Remote Control: The 
Rise of Electronic Cultural Policy, 597 ANNALS 122, 129-30 (2005). 
66 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).    
67 This is a rather simplified definition of what the public domain means, as 
much of the recent literature has focused on seeking a workable definition of the 
public domain.  See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L. J. 
965 (1990); David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, 66 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 463 (2003); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement 
and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 
(2003). 
68 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
69 Id. 
70 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003). 
71 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). 
72 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
73 See supra Part I A “What is the broadcast flag?” 
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regime, a bureaucracy will determine, in advance, what constitutes a fair 
use.”74   
¶23 Much like the statutory exception of fair use, a robust public 
domain is a necessary component to the copyright system because it 
provides creative inputs for future innovation.75  By ensuring that some 
material, such as facts and works for which copyright has expired, is 
available to the public, individuals have the freedom to express themselves 
in ways that do not run afoul of copyright.  The threat to the public domain 
from the broadcast flag exists because “the FCC rule clearly contemplates 
flagging of news and other public interest content.”76  The fear is that a 
program of important public interest, such as a news broadcast or 
educational program, might feature information which is both copyright and 
in the public domain, yet the flag will be set to prevent any copying.  The 
overarching problem is that the broadcast flag, much as it cannot pre-
approve all potential fair uses, does not differentiate between material 
subject to copyright protection and public domain material.77  There are a 
number of reasons DTV content might not be protected by copyright, 
including failure to meet copyright’s originality requirements or expiration 
of the copyright terms.78    
¶24 While some broadcasters have stated they have no intention of 
preventing the copying of public domain material, the fact remains that if 
they chose to do so, they could disregard the limits of copyright law and 
prevent access to the public domain.79 What is to stop a broadcaster from 
placing the broadcast flag on public domain material and preventing its 
further distribution other than the broadcaster’s own moral compass?  
Because there is no flexibility within the settings of the flag, there is a 
further concern, also borrowed from the DMCA discussion, that a 
broadcaster could include some small amount of copyrighted material in an 
otherwise public domain broadcast and flag the entire program.  This kind 
of copy control exerted over material that is not subject to copyright 
presents a serious concern for future creative expression. 
                                                     
74 Robert T. Numbers II, Note, To Promote Profit in Science and the Useful 
Arts: The Broadcast Flag, FCC Jurisdiction, and Copyright Implications, 80 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 460-61 (Nov. 2004). 
75 Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L. J. 965, 967 (1990) (“[T]he 
public domain is the law’s primary safeguard of the raw material that makes 
authorship possible.”). 
76 CDT Report, supra note 14, at 25. 
77 See supra Part IA on “What is the broadcast flag?”; Since the flag is just 
placed on the signal, it only marks whether something is broadcast in DTV and 
nothing else. 
78 Numbers, supra note 74, at 457-58. 
79 See CDT Report, supra note 14, at 25. 
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2. Supporting consumer rights 
¶25 The MPAA claims that “[t]he broadcast flag will in no way 
interfere with your personal enjoyment of television programming.”80  But 
the Center for Democracy and Technology (“CDT”) points out the only 
continuing protection of reasonable consumer uses in the FCC regulation is 
that while reviewing a technology for authorization “the Commission may 
(though is not required to) consider. . . the extent to which the technology 
‘accommodates consumers’ use and enjoyment’ of DTV broadcasts.”81  In 
the words of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a major critic of the 
broadcast flag regulation, “‘The broadcast flag will in no way interf[ere]’ 
with what you want to do only if you do it with a Hollywood-approved 
technology – and only if it can be done with a Hollywood-approved 
technology.”82  Some advocates worry that there is no guarantee that 
content sharing over networks, even secure networks, will ever be 
authorized.83  Finally, consumer advocates fear that more restrictive 
protection technologies will become dominant in the marketplace and 
consumers will have “little choice but to forego some reasonable uses in 
order to access DTV content.”84    
3. Ensuring continued technological innovation 
¶26 Ultimately, the goal of device manufacturers is for full 
interoperability: televisions will interact freely with digital recorders, digital 
cameras, personal computers and the Internet.85  The imposition of the 
broadcast flag regulation on all devices that come into contact with over-
the-air DTV signals could severely limit the push for global interoperability.  
It is undeniable that under the flag scheme, “[t]o the extent that any 
manufacturer of any device wishes to have that device connect to devices 
that touch [] broadcast content, that manufacturer will have to comply with 
the licensing rules authorized by the flag proceeding – which in turn will 
limit interoperability to those devices that are themselves compliant.”86   
¶27 At the center of the innovation concern is the home computer and 
its status as an open platform device.87  If a computer manufacturer wishes 
to allow contact with broadcast flagged content it must meet the FCC 
requirements.88  One of the more interesting and flexible features of current 
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computer architecture is the presence of unregulated digital outputs. If the 
home computer is governed by the broadcast flag rules, this feature will 
necessarily be removed.89  The CDT puts forth the uncontroversial claim 
that the “open architecture of the computer . . . has been a driving force in 
the digital revolution.”90  A substantial change to that openness could have 
long-lasting deleterious effects on further technological revolutions. 
¶28 The impact of regulations like the broadcast flag on technological 
innovation has received increased attention in recent months.  Many people 
are concerned that the Supreme Court’s decision in MGM v. Grokster, 
Ltd.91 will have a negative effect on innovators who are afraid of secondary 
liability for copyright infringement.92  In extending contributory 
infringement to include inducement and looking to the advertising of new 
technologies, some consumer electronics manufacturers are worried about 
their liability when introducing new technologies.  The broadcast flag does 
not allow for the same type of concern, because electronics manufacturers 
have no choice but to comply if their equipment comes into contact with 
DTV material.93  This limitation on innovation is antithetical to the rule 
developed in Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.94 that “the 
copyright laws are not intended to discourage or to control the emergence of 
new technologies.”95   
III. THE BROADCAST FLAG AS CAUTIONARY TALE 
¶29 There is a lot to criticize when it comes to the broadcast flag.  The 
previous section provides merely a short overview of some of its more 
prevalent flaws.  At the core of these various frustrations is the notion that 
the MPAA and Hollywood are seeking to prevent exploration of the broad 
possibilities the Internet and digital technologies present in order to preserve 
their existing business practices.  There is nothing inherently wrong with 
entrenched players, such as the major movie studios, seeking to secure their 
own position through active political lobbying.96  In fact, it would be a 
disservice to their shareholders not to attempt to maximize profit in any way 
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the law allows.  However, it is a disservice to the public at large to stunt the 
growth of technological innovation to protect rights that were never 
knowingly granted in the first place. These rights go beyond the traditional 
bounds of copyright to control of free television broadcast and access to and 
use of legally purchased materials.   
¶30 There is a long tradition in America of unencrypted over-the-air 
television broadcasts. But, as Susan Crawford points out, “there is no 
regulatory mandate that television broadcasts be unencrypted.”97  
According to Crawford, the question now is if we are going to require 
encryption of this once free transmission, where should the encryption take 
place?98  At the broadcaster level or at the mechanical receiver level?99  
Perhaps we would be better served by first asking whether encryption 
should be required in the first place?  And in the words of Judge Harry 
Edwards of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, if we 
start to encrypt free broadcast television, will washing machines be 
regulated by the FCC next?100   
¶31 Unfortunately, Congress has been willing to pass sweeping 
legislation in the service of protecting Hollywood from digital 
encroachment.  The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) makes it 
illegal to circumvent digital encryption of copyrighted materials.101  It was 
passed by Congress five years before the rule-making of the broadcast flag 
and its constitutionality has been upheld in a number of federal court 
cases.102  But many of the same criticisms that are being leveled at the 
broadcast flag were rehearsed in the fight against the DMCA.103 
¶32 We are allowing Hollywood to dictate the terms of this fight and 
answer these important questions before they are properly asked.    
Hollywood insists that it is merely protecting itself against the vile actions 
of pirates.  But technology should not always be subverted in favor of the 
rights asserted by Hollywood.  Historically, technological changes have 
triggered re-evaluation of existing rights, the acknowledgement of new 
rights and the revocation of old rights.  The right to flag broadcasts should 
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not be given to Hollywood before the rest of us have a chance to evaluate its 
claims. 
¶33 Over ten years ago, Professor David Lange posited that emerging 
digital technologies would require an overhaul of our conceptions of 
authorship.104  Lange agreed with the work of Tom Palmer, on the 
relationship between technological innovations and intellectual property 
law:  
Authorship and invention, the very acts rewarded by intellectual 
property law, may not be timeless concepts plucked from Heaven but 
may emerge in conjunction with – and be inextricably intertwined with 
– the technology that makes them possible.  The relationship between 
intellectual property rights and technology poses a very important 
question: If laws are dependent for their emergence and validation 
upon technological innovations, might not succeeding innovations 
require that those very laws pass back out of existence?105
Could it be that the technological changes brought about by the Internet 
could require some of the laws, business models and rights Hollywood is 
relying on to “pass back out of existence?”   
¶34 Imagine that instead of the transition from analog to digital 
technology we were talking about the transition from buggy whips to 
internal combustion engines. It is highly doubtful that given the potential of 
the automobile and other innovations we would allow the horse industries to 
capture the rule-making processes.106 But those who oppose the fencing off 
of technological innovation cannot merely stand outside the fences and tell 
us it is a bad idea.  Decrying the destruction of fair use, the shrinking of the 
public domain, the enclosure of the commons, the violation of consumer 
rights, the overstepping of regulatory jurisdiction is meaningless without 
first convincing the American public that they have a vested interest in the 
outcome of this debate.  In recent cases, including ALA v. FCC107 and MGM 
v. Grokster,108 a powerful ally emerged in the form of the consumer 
electronics industry.  While digital technologies have caused alarm among 
copyright owners, they have contrastingly created excitement among 
innovators, who are increasingly reluctant to allow blind regulation of 
technology in the service of copyright protection to stifle innovation. 
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¶35 What needs to be created is a politics of expression that educates 
citizens about the interaction between their rights as consumers, their rights 
of access to and use of copyrighted materials, their First Amendment rights 
of free expression, and the need for digital innovation.  There are growing 
attempts to create just such a politics of expression, and there are signs of 
success. From Creative Commons109 to the Internet Archive110 to an 
increased appreciation of the public domain111 to new theories on the First 
Amendment,112 there are scholars and activists pushing us toward a better 
understanding of what is at risk in this debate.  In fact, after the decision in 
ALA v. FCC and in response to lobbying by the MPAA for Congressional 
passage of the broadcast flag, Congressman Rick Boucher of California 
proposed a deal which would allow the passage of the broadcast flag in 
exchange for the restoration of the fair use rights which had been eliminated 
in the DMCA.113  A discussion of the relative merits of the various 
approaches to combating the growth of copyright control will not be 
undertaken in this iBrief.  It is enough, for the moment, to acknowledge the 
growing movement against the accepted wisdom of Hollywood.  The story 
of the broadcast flag should be incorporated in any attempt to galvanize the 
public through a new politics of expression. 
CONCLUSION 
¶36 The Motion Picture Association of America and its Hollywood 
allies are scared by the possibilities presented by the Internet and are 
responding with increasing attempts to secure more stringent intellectual 
property rights.  Even though both copying and distributing are easier and 
cheaper than ever before in the digital age, there is no compelling evidence 
that our long established laws of copyright could not continue to promote 
the progress of the sciences and useful arts without serious alteration.  There 
is also a corresponding lack of evidence that the measures sought by 
Hollywood are at all effective in addressing problems of piracy or the need 
for improved incentives to create.  Between the broadcast flag regulations 
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and the DMCA,114 Hollywood seems intent on controlling all facets of 
distribution, access, and use.   
¶37 The rights of copyright holders should undoubtedly be protected by 
the laws of the United States, but the content industries are taking for 
granted the existence of rights and controls that we have, until now, never 
had the opportunity to question.  The digital era of the Internet can provide 
an opening to a political conversation about the future of our culture and the 
technologies it relies on.  It is dangerous to allow entrenched players like 
the MPAA and Recording Industry Association of America to dictate all of 
the terms of the discussion.  Thirty years ago, when faced with another type 
of technological innovation Jack Valenti, longtime president of the MPAA, 
said that the Betamax VTR, the first commercially available home 
videotape recorder, was “to the motion picture industry and the American 
public . . . what the Boston Strangler is to the woman alone.”115  Valenti 
was wrong about the Betamax, and the courts were right to not listen to him.  
He’s also wrong about the Internet, and we would all do well not to listen to 
him yet again.  But we must do more than not listen; we must offer our own 
story as well. 
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